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This article analyses constituency campaigning and personalization when electoral system
and party organizational incentives conﬂict. Providing the ﬁrst study of candidate
campaign behaviour in Austria we show that a sizeable number of candidates in national
elections engage in personalized rather than party-centred campaigns. Focussing on
behavioural indicators of ‘personalized’ campaigning, we ﬁnd that individual motivation
and resources play an important role in how candidates conduct their campaigns. Factors
such as experience in political ofﬁce, the probability of winning a seat, candidate goal
choice (self- or party-promotion), the district characteristic (urban or rural) and party
afﬁliation inﬂuence the numbers of hours spent on campaigning and the kind of campaign
resources candidates use and value most.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Elections pit parties and ideas against each other. They
can be consequential for the direction of public policy, who
leads the country as the chief executive, and determine a
nation’s fate. Election contenders often frame the choice of
voters in such stark terms. More immediately, however,
general elections concern who obtains seats in parliament.
Provided that the ofﬁce of a Member of Parliament (MP) is
sufﬁciently attractive, we can expect the candidates for
these ofﬁces to take a very active part in the campaign. Yet
for most democracies we know very little about this side of
elections. While systems that employ single-member con-
stituencies and majoritarian rules have attracted a fair
amount of research on constituency level campaigns (e.g.
Jacobson, 1978; Whiteley and Seyd, 1994; Denver and
Hands, 1997; Johnston and Pattie, 2006; Fisher and
Denver, 2008), multi-member systems with proportional
representation have largely been spared (notableW.C. Müller).
er Ltd. This is an open accessexceptions include Benoit and Marsh, 2008; Górecki and
Marsh, 2012).
At the same time, the vanishing of sharp ideological
divisions, the decrease in class voting, and the decline of
party identiﬁcation have made personalization a promi-
nent theme in electoral research. In the words of Karvonen
(2010: 4), the ‘core notion of personalization is that indi-
vidual political actors have become more prominent at the
expense of parties and collective identities’. While many
contributors to the literature seem convinced of the
increasing importance of personalization (e.g. Dalton,
2000; McAllister, 2007), others are more sceptical (Adam
and Maier, 2010; Karvonen, 2010; Kriesi, 2012). With re-
gard to party leaders, the difference is between identifying
a secular trend toward an increasing weight of the top
candidates’ qualities upon the voting decision and seeing
ups and downs in the relevance of leaders, depending on
the supply of suitable personalities and the issue agenda.
Moreover, the personalization literature bifurcates be-
tween those who focus exclusively on party leaders and the
contenders for chief executive ofﬁce (e.g. Wattenberg,
1991; Brettschneider, 2002; King, 2002; van Holsteyn and
Andeweg, 2010; Stevens et al., 2011), and those who seearticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
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Karvonen (2010: 41) has put it, ‘from the point of view of
the personalization thesis, the study of individual candi-
dates is just as relevant as the focus on party leaders (see
also Zittel and Gschwend, 2008; Balmas et al., 2012).
Relevance for answering a research question, of course, is
not the same as the relevance of explaining real world
phenomena such as electoral results. McAllister (2013), for
instance, has raised doubt with regard to the candidates’
effectiveness in Australian constituency campaigns
compared to party factors.
Notwithstanding the potential relevance of personali-
zation in constituency campaigns, research on most de-
mocracies and especially on list-PR systems is only
beginning to emerge (e.g. Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2013). In
these systems, the fate of candidates is indissolubly tied to
that of their parties. Yet, in addition to candidates’ concerns
for their parties’ electoral performances, individual goals
can gain prominence.
We proceed as follows: In the next section we outline
the rationale for personalized campaigning. We also
introduce the Austrian case. Traditionally, this country
has been an extremely party-centred system. Yet in 1992,
electoral reform considerably strengthened incentives for
electoral personalization. There is thus considerable ten-
sion between the traditional normative expectations of
the parties as organizations and established behavioural
patterns on one side, and the new institutional features
on the other. Moreover, the interplay of electoral rules
and party characteristics provides different groups of
candidates with different incentives for personalized
campaigning. Building upon this, we formulate our
theoretical expectations and hypotheses. After describing
our data and methodological approach, we move on to
two empirical sections. In the ﬁrst section we describe
candidate goals. Even when pitted against party goals we
ﬁnd personal goals a prominent motivation among the
serious contenders for public ofﬁce that we surveyed in
our study. These goals constitute an independent variable
in subsequent analyses. Turning to our primary concern –
the analyses of personalized campaign behaviour – we try
to explain individual campaign effort, the importance of
personalized campaign means as well as the use of re-
sources (staff and budget) to run a personalized
campaign. In so doing, we investigate what Balmas et al.
(2012) called ‘behavioural personalization’ – individual-
ized campaign activities that distinguish themselves from
collective party actions.2. The rationale for personalized campaigning
In this paper we focus on personalized campaigns and
the campaign behaviour of individual candidates. Accord-
ing to Zittel and Gschwend (2008, 980) individualized
campaigns are characterized by ‘candidate-centred
campaign organization, a candidate-centred campaign
agenda and candidate-centred means of campaigning’.
Their conceptualization is ideal-typical, in the sense that it
describes one end of a continuum with party-centredness
being the other one.2.1. Electoral system incentives for personalized campaigning
The electoral system ‘affect[s] the extent to which in-
dividual politicians can beneﬁt by developing personal
reputations distinct from those of their party’ (Carey and
Shugart, 1995: 417-418, see also Grofman, 2005). In a
nutshell, the relevant literature on electoral systems sug-
gests that the presence of the following factors encourages
individualized behaviour of candidates (Carey and Shugart,
1995; Shugart, 2001; Karvonen, 2010, 2011). In each of the
four dimensions, our examples are not exhaustive and lis-
ted in descending order: (1) A large amount of voter-
control over the ballot (achieved through compulsory and
open primaries, allowing for the voters’ writing-in of can-
didates not pre-selected by the parties in general elections,
etc.). (2) Candidate-centred votes (votes cast for individual
candidates rather than party lists, preference votes for in-
dividual candidates on party lists). (3) Candidate-centred
vote counting (making votes cast for individual candi-
dates the only criterion for seat allocation (open lists) or
preferring candidates who have reached a threshold of
preference votes over party list candidates (ﬂexible lists)).
(4) Small electoral districts when voters cast party votes
(which will beneﬁt the candidates immediately) and large
electoral districts if the voters cast preference votes
(providing candidates with an incentive ‘to stand out in a
crowded ﬁeld of co-partisans’ (Shugart, 2001, 183).
2.2. Party organizational incentives for personalized
campaigning
In party democracies, party organizational factors
impact their candidates’ campaign strategies. In short, we
expect regionalized and factionalized parties to encourage
such behaviour. Although party regional organizations and
factions are, like parties, collectives, the strategies of their
candidates might be individualized in the sense of being
different from a common party strategy. Another factor is
the parties’ respective organizational culture that, in turn,
might relate to ideology. In short, we expect parties with a
more individualistic worldview to constitute a more
favourable environment for individualized campaigning.
2.3. The Austrian case
The present study is the ﬁrst systematic attempt at
understanding campaigning in Austria from the perspec-
tive of individual candidates. This perspective is at odds
with Austria having been a party democracy par excellence
over the post-war period. Its parties have developed
encompassing membership organizations with a dense net
of local branches and a network of subsidiary organizations
(Müller, 1994; Luther, 1999). Elections have been fought
along party lines, candidates recruited within parties
(resulting in a large share of party or public sector em-
ployees among ofﬁce holders), public ofﬁces ﬁlled with
party representatives, and their decisions have been made
according to party lines. Party cohesion in parliament ap-
proaches 100 per cent. In short, parties have been strong
organizations in their own right and a far cry from func-
tioning as vehicles for individual politicians. The
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have reﬂected that. Generations of Austrian politicians had
been socialised to deny personal ambition and to picture
themselves as loyal agents of their parties rather than po-
litical entrepreneurs with individual goals (Gerlich and
Kramer, 1969, 106–108; Knoll and Mayer, 1976, 59–68).
From a traditional perspective, Austria would thus rank
among the least likely cases to show personalized behav-
iour of parliamentary candidates.
While many of these features have survived until today,
Austria has also been affected by the decline of party loyalty
among voters and increasingly diminishing membership
since the early 1980s. This resulted in previously unknown
levels of electoral volatility since the mid 1980s (e.g.
Kritzinger et al., 2013; Plasser and Bischof, 2008). Radically
transformed parties (such as the Freedom Party, FPÖ) and
new parties (such as the Greens, the Liberal Forum, LF – a
1993 splinter from the FPÖ –, and the Alliance for the
Future of Austria, BZÖ – a 2005 splinter from the FPÖ) were
the main beneﬁciaries of this development.
One of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and People’s Party
(ÖVP) reactions to these challenges was an electoral reform
enacted in 1992. Its main goal was to signal the major
parties’ commitment to bridging the emerging gap be-
tween citizens and politicians by increasing opportunities
to participate in electoral politics. However, the SPÖ and
ÖVP also anticipated to electorally beneﬁt from the reform
in light of one particular competitive advantage vis-à-vis
the other parties: having strong organizations ‘on the
ground’ and locally rooted MPs, often combining their seat
in parliament with the post of a mayor or deputy mayor. In
contrast, the new or radically transformed parties were still
in the process of establishing themselves locally. Their
electoral success was seen largely tied to their presence in
the national media. Indeed they often had national leaders,
in particular Jörg Haider (FPÖ, later BZÖ), who commanded
great communication skills and reached out to a large
segment of the electorate. Through the 1992 electoral re-
form, the major parties aimed at balancing their disad-
vantages in the national arena by increasing the electoral
relevance of their organizational strengths ‘on the ground’,
the local roots of their representatives, and the services
they provide to the regions (Müller et al., 2004).
Some of the proponents of the reform hoped that
vigorous competition for constituency seats between the
two major parties might lead to a ‘crowding-out’ of the
smaller parties. They also expected that competition be-
tween individual candidates for preferential votes would
lead to increased campaign efforts on their part with pos-
itive externalities for their party, as each preferential vote is
also a party vote.
Such claims regarding the beneﬁcial effects of the new
preferential vote system on the two major parties did not
remain uncontested. Critics of the electoral reform partic-
ularly highlighted the danger of party-inﬁghting. They
warned that such behaviour would detract candidates from
competing with rival parties and would thereby reveal and
indeed deepen intra-party conﬂicts. In essence, introducing
intra-party competition to the Austrian electoral process
was feared to cause negative externalities for the party, if
not party democracy as such.Austria’s 1992 electoral system (ﬁrst employed in 1994)
contains two elements that pay tribute to the strategic
considerations of the major parties outlined above: the
creation of 43 regional electoral districts as a new ﬁrst layer
of the electoral system (below the 9 Land districts that
remained from the previous system) and the ‘strength-
ening’ of the preferential vote system (Müller, 2005). A
third one was the introduction of a 4 per cent national
threshold (as alternative to winning one regional seat) that
is not relevant in the context of personalization.
The 1992 reform strengthened the preferential voting
system by introducing it to the new regional districts (in
addition to the Land districts), by applying less restrictive
thresholds for changing the party lists, and by printing the
regional candidates’ names on the ballot paper compared to
the write-in system still practiced at the Land level. Each
voter can tick one regional candidate and write-in the name
of one Land candidate. Although the number of votes
required for a seat at the regional and Land levels is identical,
the number of required preferential votes is not. While the
number of preferential votes required for a Land seat equals
that of party votes required for winning a seat on the Land
level, 50 per cent of that threshold or one sixth of the votes
cast for the candidate’s party in the district are sufﬁcient on
the regional level (provided the party has gained enough
totalvotes forobtaininga seat). The second threshold ismuch
easier to cross than the ﬁrst. Once a candidate has won the
required number of preferential votes he or shemoves to the
top of the party list unless another candidate has won more
preferential votes. The regional electoral districts are small
enough to allow active and locally rooted candidates to
personally contact a large enoughnumber of potential voters
and to hence make personal vote-earning efforts potentially
rewarding (cf. Bowler and Farrell, 1993, 53; Grofman, 2005;
Shugart et al., 2005, 449).
The second feature of the electoral system that privi-
leges regional districts as ‘hunting grounds’ for preferential
votes concerns the process of casting a preferential vote.
Recognizing and ticking a name (regional districts) is much
less demanding than writing-in the name (Land level).
Therefore, the former is more likely to occur as a reaction to
the stimulus of name recognition on the ballot paper.
Moreover, ticking a name requires less time in the ballot
booth and voters need not to be afraid of spoiling their vote
by misspelling a candidate’s name or writing it in a wrong
place on the ballot paper.
In terms of the four dimensions of electoral systems that
may provide incentives for personalized behaviour, Austrian
parties thus havemaintained full control over candidate lists.
However, in terms of casting and counting votes, incentives
for personalization exist; constituency size alsoworks in that
direction. The electoral system thus would place Austria
somewhere in the middle ground of electoral personaliza-
tion. Consequently, the country assumes a value of 0.8 in
Karvonen’s (2010: 38) index of candidate-centredness, the
theoretical range of which is between 0 and 2.
The design of the electoral system creates several types
of candidates, depending on the level(s) – regional, Land,
national – in which they run and how multiple candidacies
combine (Müller et al., 2001). As we have seen, the electoral
system provides special incentives to regional candidates to
Table 1
Seat Allocations After the 2002 and 2006 elections.




















2002 Regional 46 0.67 59 0.75 0 0.00 0 0.00 – – 105 0.57
Land 16 0.23 13 0.16 12 0.71 15 0.83 – – 56 0.31
National 7 0.10 7 0.09 5 0.29 3 0.17 – – 22 0.12
Total 69 1.00 79 1.00 17 1.00 18 1.00 – – 183 1.00
2006 Regional 44 0.65 36 0.55 2 0.10 2 0.10 0 0.00 84 0.46
Land 17 0.25 23 0.35 14 0.67 12 0.57 3 0.43 69 0.38
National 7 0.10 7 0.11 5 0.24 7 0.33 4 0.57 30 0.16
Total 68 1.00 66 1.00 21 1.00 21 1.00 7 1.00 183 1.00
Note: Numbers of seats per party and column percentages indicating the proportion of seats won at each layer of the electoral system.
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many regional constituency candidates, who make up 84
per cent of all candidates, will also beneﬁt from a good party
result in their constituencies. Furthermore, all candidates of
parties holding ‘safe’ seats or having realistic chances of
winning seats in both regional and Land constituencies have
incentives to campaign for preferential votes.
Many seats shift back and forth between the three layers
of seat distribution due to marginal changes in party
strength. Well-placed regional constituency candidates
(who ﬁll the majority of seats) thus have strong personal
incentives to compete for marginal voters on the basis of
intensive constituency campaigns. While they may also be
placed prominently on their party’s Land list, as a rule they
prefer winning a regional constituency seat. A survey ofMPs
demonstrated that among the most relevant foci of
geographical and functional representation, the regional
electoral districts stand out even when controlling for the
type of seat held by the respondent (Müller et al., 2001, 101–
110). Such seats are attractive for incumbentMPs, as they are
typically more shielded from intra-party competition in
candidate re-nomination than Land seats. However, a pref-
erential vote system, which pitches fellow partisans against
each other, has a prominent place in the allocation of these
seats. Holding or running for a regional seat therefore pro-
vides candidates with individual incentives to campaign
hard and to maximize votes cast for them personally.
To provide the baseline for the 2006 election, Table 1
shows how the 183 parliamentary seats were allocated in
2002. Of course, parties and candidates will try to anticipate
the result of the election in which they are running. Table 1
therefore also contains the 2006 seat allocation. Given that
gains and losses of the parties running in 2006 went in the
expected directions but were stronger than forecasted, the
actual results for 2002 and 2006 can thus be interpreted as a
realistic range that might have guided candidate expecta-
tions.While it is often difﬁcult to predict inwhich layer of the
electoral system marginal seats are allocated to the individ-
ual parties, two empirical patterns are noteworthy: First,
small parties are unlikely to win regional district seats. Sec-
ond, with regard to the seats allocated at the Land level the
four largest parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and Greens) are almost
equally strong. As a consequence of both, the bulk of FPÖ,
Green, BZÖ and small party candidates in general have less
individual incentives to campaign in the regional districts.Their prospects of winning a seat depend largely on their
placement on the Land list rather than on marginal changes
in the regional vote shares. In contrast, at the Land level
candidates from the four larger parties have very similar in-
dividual ofﬁce incentives.
In line with theoretical expectations resulting from neo-
institutionalist considerations and empirical ﬁndings for
other countries (e.g. Rahat and Shaefer, 2007) we expect that
the Austrian candidates’ campaigns will be inﬂuenced by
institutional incentives. Because of the preferential vote sys-
tem’s features and local ties, our ﬁrst hypothesis states that
regional candidates should bemost likely to runpersonalized
campaigns (H1). While important, electoral systems are not
the sole driver of candidate behaviour. Candidate and con-
stituency characteristics should also be relevant.
If anything, the speciﬁc context of the 2006 elections
strengthened the incentives for the ‘personalization of
campaigning’ as the major parties were led by unpopular
leaders and faced an exceptionally large number of serious
contenders. In addition to the already mentioned parties
(ÖVP, SPÖ, Greens, FPÖ, and BZÖ), these included the List
Dr. Martin (MATIN on the ballot paper, as only ﬁve char-
acters are allowed) (Müller, 2008). In the following section,
we systematically discuss what we consider to be the main
factors affecting the behaviour of Austrian constituency
candidates.
2.4. Candidate and constituency characteristics as predictors
of personalized campaigns
In ﬁghting elections, Austrian parties symbolically rally
their troops around the banner by nominating the
maximum number of candidates allowed by the electoral
law or whatever they can muster. In ‘top-s’ systems such as
the Austrian one, which determine the number of seats
allocated to parties before allocating seats within parties,
‘ﬁlling out a list with clearly hopeless candidates [.] may
be advantageous if these candidates attract additional
voters to the party’ (Bergman et al., 2013). Such candidate
attractiveness results from their appeal to voters as candi-
dates and the increased effort they make in the campaign
to justify their nomination. Austrian candidate lists thus
extend way beyond the potentially promising list places
and, indeed, the number of total seats. In 2006, the seven
parties studied here enlisted more than 3000 candidates.
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slightest chance of getting elected and only a few of them
could hope to move up the party lists over time quickly
enough to get elected to parliament during their lifetime.
Yet, each of them can technically be elected by preferential
votes and the Austrian system is rich with political ofﬁces
to provide alternative career paths for many of the candi-
dates. The universe of candidates, therefore, consists of
different sub-groups: professional politicians, aspiring
semi-professionals, and true amateurs who are honoured
by their party’s nomination and who want to demonstrate
their solidarity by showing public commitment to their
party. Candidates ranked low on their parties’ list typically
campaign less as contenders for winning a mandate or
advancing their career, but rather as die-hard party activists
aiming to get out the vote for their party and for its local
champions. As such, they provide a very useful comple-
ment to the main contenders for parliamentary seats. In
accordance with these different sub-groups, we ﬁnd sub-
stantial variation regarding individual motivations and
ambitions within the candidate universe. Hence, we must
consider motivational factors (cf. Searing, 1994) or candi-
date goals in order to understand why candidates perform
speciﬁc acts or choose certain strategies. Speciﬁcally, we
expect candidates whose campaign goal is self-promotion
rather than the promotion of their party to run more
personalized campaigns (H2).
Running a campaign, and a personalized campaign in
particular, is costly in many ways. Unless candidates are
able and willing to provide money from their own pockets,
candidates have to court sympathizers for contributing
money and labour to the staff. The US literature on
Congressional elections has identiﬁed many factors that
inﬂuence the unequal ﬂow of resources towards candi-
dates. Incumbents are generally seen as advantaged due to
higher name recognition from serving in political ofﬁce and
the associated opportunities for maintaining their ‘elec-
toral connection’ (Mayhew, 1974; Benoit and Marsh, 2008).
Resources are likely to ﬂow towards non-incumbents when
a ‘challenger is seen as of ‘high quality’ andwhen the race is
seen as competitive (i.e. with the contender having a
chance to beat the incumbent) (Jacobson and Kernell,
1981). In multi-member district elections, the competitive
situation is much more complex. Although cases of intra-
party rivalries and actual defeat by preferential votes are
very rare in Austria, they should still alert MPs that winning
the party nomination might not be sufﬁcient even if ‘their’
seat is ‘safe’ from a party perspective. In the words of
Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2009, 277),‘fear of losing ofﬁce is
an existential fact in political life’ and a few prominent
cases are sufﬁcient ‘to see how realistic that fear is, and to
imagine the lengths to which leaders might go to cope with
it’. Moreover, preferential voting results are important
beyond their immediate impact, as candidate selection
occurs in the shadow of previous election results. Any
incumbent trailing signiﬁcantly behind any intra-party
challenger may ﬁnd it hard to be re-nominated as candi-
date next time. This provides additional incentives for
candidates to campaign hard locally and to cultivate a
‘personal vote’. In the Austrian setting, we thus expect
candidates on the parties’ ‘safe’ and ‘hopeful’ seats (whobothmay directly beneﬁt from party and preferential votes)
to run personalized campaigns (H3). While such candidate
characteristics, in turn, could also motivate the donation of
labour and money to the candidates, we know that many
personal campaign resources are from the candidates’
private funds. In terms of political biography, we expect
politically more experienced candidates (i.e. incumbent MPs
and others who hold or held public ofﬁces with similar
status) to be more akin to run personalized campaigns
compared to political newcomers (H4).
In distinguishing personalized from party-centred
campaigns, we thus test for the relevance of four charac-
teristics: greater effort (time spent on the campaign), the
use of personalized campaign means, having a personal
campaign team, and having individual campaign funds.
We consider urban and rural electoral environments to
be distinct and to cause different patterns of candidate
behaviour. There is a long tradition in political science of
looking at differences in political participation and voting in
urban versus rural areas (e.g. Dahl, 1967; Tarrow, 1971;
Oliver, 2000; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Studies inspired by so-
cial network analysis have rightly pointed out that this
geographic distinction often serves as a proxy for charac-
teristics that are more difﬁcult to measure such as differ-
ences in social relations and political communication ﬂows
(Eulau and Rothenberg, 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995;
Baybeck and Huckfeldt, 2002). Regardless of the labels used,
politicians are sensitive to the differences and take them
into account in their relations with voters (e.g. Fenno, 1978).
More speciﬁcally, in the context of the study of campaigning,
the urban-rural distinction has featured prominently in
work on Japan (Curtis, 2009 [1971]; Richardson, 1988;
Dabney, 2009). Austrian MPs have also referred to the
urban–rural distinction, for instance with regard to the
importance of the representatives living in their electoral
district (which is considered very important in case of rural
districts but less so in others). The social interaction with
voters in an urban context is described as being more
impersonal in the latter context (Müller et al., 2001, 111). We
hypothesize that rural contexts might make it easier for
candidates to reach their target population (for example via
local events and networks) and to establish a personal
rapport with many voters. We expect rural candidates to
take advantage of these opportunities and to be more likely
to engage in personalized campaigning (H5).
We include demographic variables for gender, age, and
education as well as the candidates’ party afﬁliation as
control variables. Party afﬁliation stands for the combined
effects of aggregate characteristics such as the size of the
party, intra-party factionalism and a party’s collective at-
titudes towards individualized campaigning. We have
already pointed out that candidates from the smaller
parties (in descending order: FPÖ, BZÖ, Greens, MARTIN,
and KPÖ) have a weaker incentive to compete for prefer-
ential votes because these parties are unlikely to win
regional electoral district seats. Therefore their candidates
should be much less inclined to seek election through
personalized campaign behaviour. Leftist parties (the SPÖ,
KPÖ and, to a lesser extent, the Greens) should adheremore
to collective values whereas rightist parties (ÖVP, FPÖ, BZÖ)
are more partial to an individualistic worldview (Duverger,
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 39 (2015) 316–328 3211959, 170). The ÖVP is, relatively speaking, the most fac-
tionalised among the seven parties. It is characterized by
the existence of three ofﬁcial and well-organised party
factions, the so-called leagues – organising business,
farmers, and workers and employees, respectively, and
other special interests that enjoy greater privilege than
their counterparts in other parties (Müller and Steininger,
1994). Although candidate selection in the ÖVP is based
on inter-league bargaining and list-balancing, it is easy for
individual candidates who are unsatisﬁed with the
outcome of this process to mobilize their faction and
campaign for preferential votes. Given the predominance of
these three leagues in ﬁlling safe list places, candidates
from party sub-organisations appealing to other sizable
constituencies (such as the elderly, women, or youth) may
be tempted to ‘correct’ the candidate lists by appealing for
preferential votes. Overall, ÖVP candidates should be more
likely to run personalized campaigns than candidates of the
other parties.
3. Data and methods
The data employed in the present paper comes from our
mail survey among the candidates for the 2006 general
election (see appendix for details); the ﬁrst study of can-
didates in Austrian national elections. It provides infor-
mation about individual candidates’ campaign goals and
resources. Unlike other countries, where researchers have
been able to draw on public registers of campaign contri-
butions and expenditures, Austria had – for instance – no
legal regulations on campaign ﬁnance for candidates at the
time of the survey. Notwithstanding the inherent limita-
tions, it thus constitutes the best source on most supply
side aspects of constituency campaigns.
The questionnaire was sent out to all enlisted candidates
of all parties running in the 2006 elections, making up a
total number of 3311 people. The number of candidacies is
much larger, as candidates can run at all three levels of the
electoral system and ‘combined’ candidacies are indeed
frequent. The candidate survey response rate of 42.6% was
very good by the conventional standards of elite surveys and
its representativeness is excellent (see Table A-1). We
therefore abstain from weighting the data. We have com-
plemented the survey data with ofﬁcial data on personal
characteristics of candidates and the electoral results. In this
paper, we restrict the analysis to candidates from the ﬁve
established parties and from two challenger parties, the List
Dr. Martin (MATIN) and the Communist Party (KPÖ). We
leave out 105 candidates from ﬁve small ﬂash parties.
The remainder of this section discusses the dependent
and independent variables that will be used in the regres-
sion models.
3.1. Operationalization of variables and indices
3.1.1. Dependent variables
Subsequent multivariate regressions will employ four
different dependent variables: campaign effort measured
in the hours spent on campaigning, the importance of
personalized campaign means, and the size of the personal
campaign team and campaign budget.Individual campaign effort is based upon the hours per
week the candidates devoted to a range of campaign ac-
tivities in the last four weeks preceding the election. We
calculated the total amount of time spent on the campaign
trail in hours per day. As some candidates seem to have
counted the same activity under two or more labels we set
a ‘plausibility cap’ at a maximum of 15 h per day.
We asked the candidates to assess the importance of nine
‘classic’ campaign components to their own campaign, ﬁve
of which indicate personalized means of campaigning: own
campaign events, posters, personal advertisements in the
local media, personal ﬂyers, and media contacts. We use
judgements on these ﬁve issues (each running from 0 point
for ‘not important’ to 3 points for ‘very important’) for an
additive index with empirical values ranging from 0 to 15.
Our measure for the candidates’ campaign team and their
campaign budget take the form of two sets of binary vari-
ables, indicating whether they had a personal campaign
team or campaign budget or not. Both variables have been
measured as continuous variables. However, the distribu-
tions of values are very uneven. Very few candidates had
large campaign teams and large campaign budgets. We
therefore prefer to interpret the logit regressions rather than
the results of ordinary least squares regressions.
3.1.2. Covariates
The candidates’ campaign goal was originally measured
on a ten-point scale with endpoints indicating self-
promotion versus promotion of the party. We recoded the
variable at midpoint into a binary variable: 1 indicates self-
promotion, 0 indicates promotion of the party. This
recoding allows for a straightforward test of our hypothesis
(H1) in our statistical model.
To measure candidates’ subjective chance of winning a
seat, we asked them about their related expectations
ahead of the election (on a ﬁve point scale running from
‘none’, ‘low’, ‘open race’, ‘high’ to ‘certain’). The result of
this is represented via four dummy variables. We also
calculated the individual chance of winning a seat on more
objective grounds, using the results of the previous elec-
tion, pre-election polls, the candidates’ list position(s) and
the rules of seat allocation. While the rank correlation
between objective and subjective evaluations is very high
(Goodman and Kruskal’s g ¼ 0.98), some candidates lead
their campaigns based on the objectively false assumption
that they were running in an ‘open’ race. Such over-
optimistic perceptions are common to many electoral
contexts and indeed important for the candidates’ self-
motivation.
A set of hierarchically structured binary variables indi-
cate a candidate’s highest level of previous or current po-
litical ofﬁce (‘none’, ‘local level’, ‘Land level’ (i.e. member of
a Land diet or government), and ‘national/European’).
The three-tier electoral system allows combining can-
didacies at more than one level. To reduce the complexity
we employ a hierarchical coding of the type of candidacy. A
place on a regional district party list is coded as a ‘regional’
candidacy regardless of an additional candidacy at the
second and/or third tiers. By the same logic, a place on a
Land district party list is coded as an intermediate type of
candidacy, but only if a candidate has no regional list slot.
Table 2
Descriptives of dependent variables and covariates.
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max (N)
Personalized campaign means (0–15) 5.11 3.72 0 15 (1220)
Campaign team (no/yes) 0.21 0.44 0 1 (1295)
Campaign budget (no/yes) 0.17 0.37 0 1 (1294)
Campaign hours (0/15)a 5.19 4.26 0.07 15 (1253)
Campaign goal (party/candidate) 0.21 0.41 0 1 (1266)
Subjective chance of winning a seat
Certain 0.03 0.17 0 1 (1295)
High 0.03 0.18 0 1 (1295)
Open race 0.06 0.24 0 1 (1295)
Low 0.53 0.50 0 1 (1295)
Current or previous public ofﬁce
National/European 0.05 0.23 0 1 (1318)
Regional 0.06 0.23 0 1 (1318)
Local 0.05 0.50 0 1 (1318)
Candidacy
National tier only (no/yes) 0.07 0.25 0 1 (1318)
Land tier (no/yes) 0.09 0.29 0 1 (1318)
Best list position
First (no/yes) 0.09 0.29 0 1 (1318)
Second (no/yes) 0.08 0.27 0 1 (1318)
Third (no/yes) 0.09 0.29 0 1 (1318)




Gender (male/female) 0.33 0.47 0 1 (1318)
Age 45.08 12.09 19 88 (1318)
Notes.
a Maximum of campaign hours is capped at 15 h per day.
b Levels of education are coded as 0, 0.5 and 1.
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 39 (2015) 316–328322The remaining category consists of candidates running
exclusively on the national party list.
The seven regional electoral districts in Vienna and the
ﬁve largest Land capitals (Graz, Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck,
Klagenfurt), each of which constitutes a distinct regional
district, are coded as urban districts. According to this
classiﬁcation, Austria is made up of 12 urban and 31 rural
regional districts.
The educational level of candidates is coded as an ordinal
variable (with values of 0, 0.5 and 1) indicating the highest
level of education completed by the candidates (‘primary
education’, ‘secondary education’, ‘university degree’). Bi-
nary variables indicating the candidates’ party membership
and female gender are self-evident. Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the
regression models.
In our statistical analyses we employ three types of
regression – OLS, Tobit and Logit – depending on the nature
of the dependent variable. We have chosen a Tobit
regression for campaign hours due to the right-censoring of
the data.
In the remainder of the paper we ﬁrst consider candi-
date goal-setting on a descriptive level. We then turn to
analysing the behavioural aspects of campaigning.
4. Party goals or individual goals?
As explained above, the 1992 electoral reform increased
the stakes for both parties and individual candidates in
grassroots campaigning. The two goals are aligned when
intra-partycompetition is lowornon-existent. In theabsence
of preferential votes for candidates with promising listpositions eachparty vote is also avote for them. The situation
is different in cases of intra-party competition. Then, pref-
erential votes may be more important to individual candi-
dates than party votes, particularly when their prospective
seat seems safe. Candidates who neither enjoy promising
slots nor aim for election via preferential votes may never-
theless face a choicewith regard to their campaign goal: they
may think more in terms of their party or in terms of indi-
vidual candidates they wish to support. Yet, the electoral
system provides the three types of candidates with quite
different incentives to compete for preferential votes. As we
describedabove,winning a seat ina regional electoraldistrict
via preferential votes is much easier than at the Land level.
The threshold for winning a Land seat is substantial and only
few candidates have crossed it since preferential votes were
ﬁrst introduced in 1971. Finally, as no preferential votes exist
at the national level, third-tier candidates have no incentive
to campaign for them.
A central question, therefore, is what the candidates aim
for. In the survey, candidates were asked whether they
wanted to win preferential votes for themselves, win
preferential votes for another candidate, win party votes, or
win both party and preferential votes. Table 3 shows that
preferential votes are the primary goal for 7 per cent of the
candidates but are part of their motivation for another 30.
As most candidates on the party lists do not aim at getting
elected themselves, it does not come as a surprise that
more respondents aim at preferential votes for other can-
didates than for themselves. In any case, 64 per cent of our
respondents exclusively aim at winning party votes. Table 3
reveals relevant inter-party differences, with the ÖVP
candidates being most interested in preferential votes. This
Table 3










Party Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) 2 3 36 59 (289)
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 7 9 41 43 (272)
Greens (GRÜNE) 1 2 21 76 (285)
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 2 2 26 70 (210)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) 3 6 26 65 (163)
List Dr. Martin (MATIN) 0 13 7 80 (15)
Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) 2 0 19 79 (99)
Type of candidacy Regional district 3 3 31 63 (1122)
Land district 4 7 31 58 (122)
Nationwide list only 0 9 15 76 (89)
Total 3 4 30 64 (1333)
Notes: Numbers are row percentages.
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individualistic world view.
An alternative measure that puts party goals against
individual candidate goals is what Zittel and Gschwend
(2008, 988) call the ‘campaign norm’: the candidates’ goal
with regard to raising attention either for themselves or for
their party (Table 4). The ‘campaign norm’ is not tied to
speciﬁc institutional features and allows for comparison
between countries. Correlating them as originally
measured – on four-point (preference votes vs. party votes)
and ten-point (campaign norm) scales, respectively – re-
sults in a in positive correlation (Goodman and Kruskal’s
g ¼ 0.44). It is not particularly high, partly due to the
different scales involved.
Running a personalized campaign requires time, staff
and money. Table 5 provides empirical information on
these central elements of campaigns. About half of the
candidates spent one to 5 h of campaigning per day during
the hot phase of the 2006 election campaign. Almost a
quarter of the candidates reported up to 10 h, and 16
percent reported that they spent more than 10 h per day in
campaigning. 11 percent of the candidates spent less than
an hour per day contributing to the campaign.
An overwhelming majority of candidates had no per-
sonal campaign team or campaign budget. 80 percent re-
ported they had no own campaign team and 84 percent no
own campaign budget. Only about one in ten candidates
had a non-negligible amount of own resources at their
disposal. 57 percent of the candidates reported that
personalized campaign means were not important for their
own campaign. One out of 10 candidates who evaluated
each of the ﬁve personalized campaign items as eitherTable 4
‘Campaign norm’ (in %).
Party Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)
Greens (GRÜNE)
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
List Dr. Martin (MATIN)
Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ)
Type of candidacy Regional district
Land district
Nationwide list only
Total‘important’ or ‘very important’ in their campaign occupy
the other end of the personalization scale.
5. Explaining personalized campaigns
Which candidates are most likely to run a personalized
campaign? In this section we try to establish their charac-
teristics with the help of multivariate regressions. The in-
dependent variables consist of ‘motivational’ variables (i.e.
personal campaign goal and subjective chance of winning)
and objective traits such as type of candidacy, political of-
ﬁce (current and previous career positions), the urban or
rural character of the district, party afﬁliation and de-
mographic variables such as gender, age and level of edu-
cation. The baseline candidate for the binary variables is a
male Social Democratic candidate without experience in
public ofﬁce, who runs in a regional district from a list
position correctly perceived as providing no chance of
winning a seat, and whose main campaign goal is winning
party votes.
We employ four indicators measuring how candidates
conduct their campaigns. The four models show similar
patterns as most coefﬁcients point in the same direction.
Differences in the signs of coefﬁcients relate to some
parties, to the district’s character as rural or urban, and the
candidate’s level of education.
The ﬁrst regression model tries to explain campaign
effort (i.e. the number of hours per day a candidate used for
campaigning). We use a censored regression model due to
the imposed limit of 15 h of campaigning per day. The upper
left panel of Fig. 1 shows the results of the Tobit regression.













Individual campaign effort and resources (in %).
Campaign effort (hours per
day)
Campaign team (persons) Campaign budget (Euro) Importance of personalized
campaign means (index)
Less than 1 10.7 No Team 79.7 No Budget 84.3 0 points 13.9
1 to 5 50.9 1 to 3 10.0 Up to 1000 6.7 1 to 5 points 43.0
5 to 10 22.7 4 to 10 8.6 1001–10,000 6.2 6 to 10 points 33.2
More than 10 15.7 More than 10 1.7 More than 10,000 3.1 11 to 15 points 9.9
(N) (1333) (1375) (1365) (1220)
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certain of winning a seat spent on average the greatest
amount of time on campaigning. Candidates running for
preferential votes rather than party votes also investedmore
effort, but the effect is not as large as for incumbentMPs and
candidates who expected taking a seat. Candidates in public
ofﬁce spent considerably more time on campaigning than
candidates without ofﬁce. Likewise did ﬁrst-ranked candi-
dates, even when they had no chance of winning. However,
they sharewith candidates in ofﬁce the fact that they are the
party’s ‘public faces’ and thus have to perform in a campaign
(cf. Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2013, 5).
The type of candidacy does not seem to make much of a
difference, nor does the urban or rural character of the
district. Gender and age make no difference either, though
education surprisingly does. Candidates with university
degrees reported on average 1 h less of campaigning per
day. BZÖ and KPÖ candidates gave somewhat lower esti-
mates of time spent on campaigning on average, while
MATIN candidates gave considerably higher estimates. We
can see in all panels of Fig. 1 that campaign characteristics
of candidates from the same party tend to be surprisingly
similar after controlling for other covariates.
For the indexof importance of personalizedmeansweuse
an OLS regression model with standard errors clustered by
party. Noteworthy are the considerable negative coefﬁcient
values for FPÖ, MATIN and Communist candidates. An ego-
oriented campaign goal, high subjective chance of winning
a seat, a good list position and experience in political ofﬁce
are all positively associated with attributing more impor-
tance to campaign instruments that emphasize the individ-
ual candidate rather than the party. The same characteristics
are also positively associatedwith having personal campaign
staff and budget at disposal. While securing personal
campaign resources can be seen as a necessary ﬁrst step in
running a ‘personalized’ campaign, we can follow a kind of
reversed logic: Candidateswithout access to thesemeans are
pushed towards a ‘party ﬁrst’ conception of the campaign.
The regression results support four of our ﬁve hypoth-
eses – on the role of the candidates’ campaign goal of self-
or party-promotion (H2), the chance of winning a seat (H3),
of political experience (H4) and of the urban-rural district
characteristic (H5) we ﬁnd positive support. In contrast to
our theoretical expectations, the type of candidacy (H1)
does not make much of a difference in these regression
models. This may be due to the large pool of regional list
candidates and two ‘contamination’ effects: First, while
these districts provide the strongest incentives for
personalized campaigns, the pool also includes most of the
candidates without personal ambition. Pooling these can-
didates with candidates running only in the two upper tiersdoes not provide much additional information. Second,
Land and national candidates may still have a political base
in a regional constituency even if they do not run there and
concentrate their campaign efforts there.
As expected, candidates from urban districts use
personalized campaign means to a lesser degree (H5),
though they report about the same amount of time spent on
campaigning. Candidates in urban districts also tend to have
fewercampaign resources. Rather thanbeingdisadvantaged
compared to their fellow candidates in rural districts, their
lack of resources might again be rather a consequence of
having no intention of running an ego-oriented campaign.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have highlighted constituency cam-
paigning in Austria, asking whether and to what extent it is
‘personalized’ in the sense that candidates gain promi-
nence at the expense of parties and collective identities
(Karvonen, 2010; Zittel and Gschwend, 2008). Twenty
years earlier, this probably would have been a ‘non topic’
and even today Austria is not the most likely case for it
given the considerable strength of parties as organizations
and the persistence of organizational cultures. Yet the
relative decline of the major parties, changes in their
competitive environment, and the reform of the electoral
system have provided candidates with a set of incentives to
move in the direction of ‘candidate-centred’ campaigns. In
particular, the three-tier PR-list systemwithmulti-member
constituencies that allows for preferential votes in the two
lower tiers provides incentives to marginally ‘eligible’
regional constituency candidates to campaign for party
votes and for all candidates in the two lower ties to
campaign for preferential votes. The 2006 electoral context
with unpopular national leaders of the two major parties
probably worked in this direction, too. It provided rank-
and-ﬁle candidates of these parties with incentives to
take a more central role in the campaign themselves.
Weﬁrstbrieﬂydiscussed candidates’ campaigngoalswith
a special focus on the distinction between party-centred vs.
candidate-centred campaign goals.We found that 37 percent
of the candidates have goals that include winning preferen-
tial votes. Candidateswho are optimistic about their electoral
prospects are signiﬁcantly more inclined towards self-
promotion than their party comrades further down the list.
We found that candidate-centred campaign goals are a
relevant feature in modern Austrian campaigns and indeed
dominant for a sizeable number of candidates.
Our main research interest was to determine which
candidates run personalized campaigns; that is, invest
more time, use personalized means of campaigning, rally a
Fig. 1. Regression analyses of campaign characteristics.
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 39 (2015) 316–328 325personal campaign team, and have personal campaign
funds. We ﬁnd personalized means of campaign commu-
nication to be considered at least somewhat important by
almost all respondents. Such means are valued more by
experienced politicians and by candidates who are most
likely to win a seat. The bulk of the candidates lack the
resources required for personalized campaigning. Our an-
alyses suggest that there is no single blueprint for the
candidates’ campaign strategies and that motivational
factors are important for choosing the personal mix. Can-
didates who turn to ‘personalized’ campaign means do so
because they indeed want to promote individual goals and
not just party goals. Such behaviour is more likely not onlywhen they see a chance of indeed winning a seat, but also
when they have experienced the taste of public ofﬁce. As
expected, the urban–rural divide impacts campaigning.
Urban districts are somewhat less favourable grounds for
personalized campaigning and fewer candidates could
draw on their own campaign teams and means there.
Austrian elections are still won in the national arena and
in theparties’ contest emphasizing ideasandpotential teams
of government. Yet, these choices are communicated not
only via national channels but also via a multitude of con-
stituency activities. The present paper has shown that par-
liamentary candidates are not just transmitters of centrally
formulated messages but to varying degrees make
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 39 (2015) 316–328326themselves the main content of their electioneering. While
personalisation at the top may be cyclical, for now it seems
more like a trend when focussing on the parliamentary
candidates at large.
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Table A-1
Representativeness of the study.
Party Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)
Greens (GRÜNE)
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ
List Dr. Martin (MATIN)


























Electoral districts Duncan–Index of Dissimilaritya
Land electoral districts (9)
Regional electoral districts (43)
For the calculation of the Duncan–Index see Duncan, O., Duncan, B., 1955. Ametho
(2), 210–217.
a Duncan–Index of dissimilarity: 0 [perfect ﬁt]. 100 [maximum dissimilarity
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Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Campaign goal: Me 0.78 (0.42) * 1.86 (0.26)
Subjective chance of winning a seat
Certain 3.76 (1.09) *** 2.46 (0.37)
High 2.59 (0.55) *** 2.56 (0.51)
Open race 1.45 (0.61) ** 1.94 (0.38)analysis of the data occurs under the auspices of the Aus-
trian National Election Study (AUTNES), a National
Research Network (NFN) sponsored by the Austrian Science
Fund (FWF) (S10903-G11). We are grateful to the partici-
pants in the conference ‘Candidates in Constituency Cam-
paigns from a Comparative Perspective. Is Collectivist
Representation in Established Party Democracy under
Stress?’, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 2–3, 2009,
in particularly Seth Jolly, Gideon Rahat, Thomas Zittel as
well as the reviewers of our paper.Absolute frequency Relative frequency
Population Sample Population Sample
) 654 293 0.198 0.208
625 280 0.189 0.198
525 299 0.159 0.212
602 220 0.182 0.156
) 518 171 0.156 0.121
34 15 0.010 0.011
248 100 0.075 0.071
105 33 0.032 0.023
3311 1411 1.000 1.000
7.35
1127 471 0.340 0.334
2184 940 0.660 0.666
3311 1411 1.000 1.000
0.66
176 67 0.053 0.047
3135 1344 0.947 0.953
3311 1411 1.000 1.000
0.57
183 76 0.055 0.054
3128 1335 0.945 0.946
3311 1411 1.000 1.000
0.14
231 92 0.070 0.065
289 130 0.087 0.092
2791 1189 0.843 0.843
3311 1411 1.000 1.000
0.48
3102 1319 0.937 0.935
64 32 0.019 0.023
145 60 0.044 0.042









Own campaign team Own campaign budget
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
*** 1.02 (0.12) *** 1.06 (0.16) ***
*** 1.21 (0.47) *** 1.07 (0.61) *
*** 1.36 (0.36) *** 1.01 (0.27) ***
*** 1.20 (0.42) *** 0.49 (0.42)
Table A-2 (continued )




campaign means (index 0–15)
Own campaign team Own campaign budget
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Low 0.42 (0.30) 1.32 (0.33) *** 0.52 (0.27) * 0.66 (0.21) ***
Current or previous public ofﬁce
National/European 2.14 (0.74) *** 0.77 (0.45) 0.96 (0.40) ** 1.18 (0.51) **
Regional 3.29 (0.50) *** 1.39 (0.29) *** 0.07 (0.46) 0.36 (0.72)
Local 0.51 (0.29) * 0.50 (0.18) ** 0.22 (0.20) 0.26 (0.30)
Candidacy
National list 0.26 (0.58) 0.19 (0.27) 0.24 (0.20) 0.37 (0.41)
Land list 0.67 (0.49) 0.22 (0.20) 0.08 (0.25) 0.02 (0.49)
Best list position
First 1.87 (0.65) *** 1.09 (0.28) *** 1.04 (0.28) *** 1.11 (0.35) ***
Second 1.04 (0.63) 1.17 (0.42) ** 0.69 (0.29) ** 1.04 (0.35) ***
Third 0.38 (0.39) 0.31 (0.47) 0.85 (0.27) *** 0.69 (0.26) ***
Urban regional district 0.59 (0.35) * 0.89 (0.20) *** 0.65 (0.12) *** 0.35 (0.25)
Party afﬁliation
People’s Party 0.43 (0.07) *** 0.90 (0.03) *** 0.05 (0.05) 0.47 (0.06) ***
Freedom Party 0.15 (0.15) 2.05 (0.12) *** 0.09 (0.08) *** 0.57 (0.05) ***
Alliance for the Future of Austria 1.42 (0.10) *** 0.51 (0.09) *** 0.07 (0.05) 0.32 (0.07) ***
Greens 0.62 (0.10) *** 0.75 (0.07) *** 0.75 (0.10) 1.38 (0.10) ***
List Martin 2.45 (0.21) *** 2.76 (0.10) *** 1.97 (0.32) *** 1.41 (0.38) ***
Communist Party 1.62 (0.30) *** 1.44 (0.12) *** 1.39 (0.05) *** 1.39 (0.26) ***
Socio-demographics
Female 0.22 (0.17) 0.05 (0.16) 0.51 (0.17) *** 1.06 (0.05) ***
Age 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Education 1.02 (0.45) ** 1.18 (0.26) *** 0.02 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11)
Constant 6.20 (0.58) *** 5.06 (0.46) *** 1.21 (0.50) ** 1.85 (0.49) ***
Observations 1209 1179 1233 1232
Log (Pseudo) likelihood 3277 2537 3222 420
Adjusted R2 0.27
PCP/PRE 83%/19% 86%/16%
AIC 6565 5087 1008 866
BIC 6596 5117 1039 897
Notes: Standard errors clustered by party. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
Note: Any written survey poses the question whether the members of the target group or someone else actually answered the questionnaires. We rely on
several plausibility indicators. To begin with, the vast majority of our respondents simply do not command personal political staff for delegating such a task.
Sitting MPs have modest personnel resources available. However, these jobs are not too well paid and typically ﬁlled with youngsters who are in their ﬁrst
job. The handwritten answers to our open questions typically suggest that they are frommore mature hands, plausibly representing the age structure of our
sample. Finally, the contents of the handwriting, including personal messages to the senior researcher (who had spoken to the contacted MPs on other
occasions) and a great number of comments on the questions themselves, suggest that we have indeed received answers from our target group even when
they commanded personal staff.
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